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Abstract
Secularity in the sense of a social imaginary, an appreciation for the differentiation 
between religious and political authority, and the acknowledgement of religious plural-
ity surely exist. While, like Senegal and Turkey, Indonesia is a Muslim state that is in the 
process of translating democracy into its own institutional legacies and of crafting its 
own brand of democratic religion-state relations, it is probably unique as a case where, 
although religious and political authority is separated, citizenship is tied to religion. 
This implies that one’s declared religious affiliation determines the type of religious ed-
ucation and personal law one will be subject to. And there is more: religions are in some 
ways highly regulated by the state. As the author will argue in the following, in an effort 
to subsume all social and civic life in the two post-independence authoritarian regimes 
(1945-1965 and 1965-1998) to the twin goals of political order and economic growth, 
state bureaucrats sought to ‘modernize’ religion and thereby highly bureaucratized it. 
Religion in post-independence Indonesia was not only made ‘manageable’ but also put 
into the service of government policy.
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Resumen
La laicidad, como imaginario social, como atención hacia la diferenciación entre au-
toridad religiosa y política y reconocimiento de la pluralidad religiosa, en la Indonesia 
de la post-independencia sin lugar a dudas existe. Si, por una parte – tal como Senegal 
y Turquía – Indonesia es un Estado islámico a punto de introducir la democracia en su 
sistema institucional tradicional y de elaborar un modelo propio de las relaciones reli-
gión-estado en sentido democrático, por otra parte es el único Estado en el que la ciuda-
danía está relacionada con la religión, aunque religión y autoridad política estén separa-
das. Esto implica que la pertenencia religiosa determina el tipo de educación religiosa y 
el “derecho de la persona” al cual uno está sometido. Además, las religiones están, pues, 
fuertemente reglamentadas por el Estado. Tal como subraya la autora en este artículo, 
con la intención de englobar toda la vida social y civil en los dos regímenes autoritarios 
de la post-independencia (1945-1965 e 1965-1998) para llegar al objetivo del orden po-
lítico y del crecimiento económico, los burócratas estatales han intentado “modernizar” 
la religión, burocratizándola profundamente. En la Indonesia de la post-independencia, 
la religión no solo ha sido convertida en “manejable”, “accesible”, sino también ha sido 
entregada al servicio de las políticas del Gobierno. 
Palabras clave 
Secularización, ciudadanía, libertad religiosa, identidad política.
Introduction
If secularity involves the move from a society where belief in God is in principle un-
challenged to one where it is one option among others (Taylor’s Secularity III), post-in-
dependence Indonesia (1945-) is not secular. If modern secularity is a field of increas-
ingly ‘multiform contestation’, Indonesian society is not a secular society. It is unsecular 
by law, in that Indonesian citizenship is tied to religion. It is impossible to register as 
an atheist, agnostic, or adherent of one of the non-recognized religions in Indonesia. 
One can also hardly speak of multiform constestation in that religions hardly com-
pete with one another. Conversion rates are very low and proselytization prohibited. Yet 
secularity in the sense of a social imaginary, an appreciation for the differentiation be-
tween religious and political authority, and the acknowledgement of religious plurality 
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(Taylor’s Secularity I) surely exist. With that simultaneity of state-induced impossibility 
of Charles Taylor’s secularity III, with socially embedded understanding of secularity 
I, the case of Indonesia presents a case of its own. While, like Senegal and Turkey, it 
is a Muslim state that is in the process of translating democracy into its own institu-
tional legacies and of crafting its own brand of democratic religion-state relations, it is 
probably unique as a case where, although religious and political authority is separated, 
citizenship is tied to religion.1 This implies that one’s declared religious affiliation deter-
mines the type of religious education and personal law one will be subject to. And there 
is more: religions are in some ways highly regulated by the state. As I will argue in the 
following, in an effort to subsume all social and civic life in the two post-independence 
authoritarian regimes (1945-1965 and 1965-1998) to the twin goals of political order 
and economic growth, state bureaucrats sought to ‘modernize’ religion and thereby 
highly bureaucratized it. 
What are the conditions of belief in such a state, where ‘freedom of conscience’ in the 
sense that non-religion is an option and that there is religion outside state-sanctioned 
perimeters does not exist? 
bureaucratization: The Response of a “Pan-religious” Indone-
sian State to questions of Religion and Religious Identity
Indonesia is a multi-religious, multi-cultural and pluri-legal state. Its 86% Muslim 
majority is internally highly heterogeneous and bound together more by the overall 
label than agreement in matters of faith and notions of religious law. Its minority of 
Christians (9%), Buddhists (3.5%) and Hindus (1.5%) are also internally highly het-
erogeneous. After independence in 1945, the Indonesian leaders faced the very same 
question that the founders of India encountered: what kind of state should Indonesia 
become, and should the state be based on a core ethos? Like India, despite the existence 
of an overwhelming religious majority, Indonesia was also a multi-religious, multi-lin-
guistic and pluri-legal society. In addition to Islam and Christianity, ancient traditions 
of Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism as well as several dozen indigenous belief sys-
1. Senegal, Turkey, and Indonesia, together with Albania and Mali belong to the five countries in the Muslim world that 
underwent democratization processes and were coded, in the three indices on regime type considered most authoritative in 
the discipline of Political Science (Polity IV, Freedom House, BTI), as democracies between 2000 and 2011. See, for instan-
ce, M. Künkler, “Religion-State Relations and Democracy in Egypt and Tunisia: Models from the Democratizing Muslim 
World –and their Limits”, in Swiss Political Science Review, 18, 2012, pp. 114–119.
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tems existed across the archipelago. In the process of state and nation-building, the 
founding elite decided that in order to overcome existing schisms and attain national 
unity, they had to strive for the homogenization of diverse religious cultures and iden-
tities, and do away with the fragmented colonial legal system which, they believed, was 
unfit for a unitary modern nation-state. 
Before independence in 1945, the country’s judicial system had been separated into 
colonial, customary (adat) and Islamic legal systems. Customary legal systems existed 
side by side in those areas ruled indirectly, with 19 different jurisdictions based on cul-
tural and linguistic particularity. Customary law was not codified and applicable only in 
matters where no civil law statute yet existed. In some regions, customary courts were 
eliminated in the early years after independence in 1945, in others, where separatist 
struggles were fought, their phasing out occurred more gradually and was completed 
only in 1969.2 While the central state succeeded in gradually eliminating customary 
courts from region to region, the same was not true for Islamic courts. Since mobiliza-
tion in favor of their retainment was centralized (in contrast to the customary courts 
where mobilization was region-based), the central state did not succeed in doing away 
with the Islamic courts and in unifying the court system entirely. As will be further dis-
cussed below, Islamic courts survived and the duality of qadi courts (applying Islamic 
family law) versus secular courts exists until today.3 
Against the background of the great plurality in culture, religion and legal tradi-
tions, the founders recognized that in order to preserve the territorial unity of the new 
state, they had to accommodate cultural particularity and allow at least some degree of 
religious and legal diversity. Thus, the motto of Indonesia became “Bhinneka Tunggal 
Ika” or “Unity in Diversity.” Against this background, the founders were particularly 
preoccupied with the question of what role religion, especially Islam, was to play: on 
the one hand, after centuries of colonial rule, here was a chance to create a state where 
Islam would be the primary source of law. On the other, cultural norms that created 
and conserved great diversity across the archipelago would make a shared and uni-
form understanding of Islamic law difficult, and the proclamation of an Islamic State 
(Negara Islam) might provoke non-Muslim islands in the East of the archipelago to se-
2. By the time the center had eradicated all separatist struggles in 1969, the last customary courts were replaced by national 
state courts.
3. Islamic law had first been recognized as law in the 1882 Royal Decree establishing a “priest court” in Java and Madura, 
with jurisdiction over awqaf (religious endowments), and Muslim family and inheritance law in cases where all parties 
were Muslim. The priest court enjoyed concurrent jurisdiction with the regular (“native”) courts in Java and Madura. The 
priest court was composed of a President selected from officers of the regular courts, as well as three to eight Islamic judges 
(qadis), who were all appointed by the Governor-General. 
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cede. Ultimately, the final version of the constitution that the drafting committee agreed 
upon was not that of an Islamic state but a state with equal citizenship for Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike. That the state should nevertheless have an ethical mandate, if it 
should not have an explicitly Islamic one, was a matter members of the constitutional 
drafting committee felt strongly about: religion should matter for Indonesian-ness. A 
list of five ethical principles was adopted in the preamble to the 1945 constitution that 
commit Indonesians to (1) the belief in the one and only God, (2) a just and civilized 
humanity, (3) the unity of Indonesia, (4) democracy guided by the inner wisdom of 
unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives, and (5) social justice.4 
These five principles, called ‘pancasila’ (notably Sanskrit rather than bahasa Indo-
nesia or Arabic), were developed by nationalist leader Sukarno, who later became the 
country’s first president.5 Muslim modernists in principle accepted Sukarno’s pancasila, 
but demanded that a clause stipulating the implementation of Islamic law accompany 
the first principle: Belief in one God with the obligation to implement the sharica for 
adherents of Islam. This supplementary clause, which came to be known as the ‘Jakarta 
Charter’, was accepted in the drafting committee on June 22, 1945. Nearly two months 
later, however, when the committee convened again to sign the constitutional preamble 
on August 18, 1945, the seven words of the Jakarta Charter were dropped from the final 
version due to the fear that non-Muslim regions would secede if Islamic law were to 
be enforced.6 Three further changes had taken place by August 18: the Arabic word for 
“preamble”, mukaddimah, was replaced by the Indonesian pembukaan; in paragraph 6 
the provision that the president of Indonesia be Muslim was deleted; and in one for-
mula which suggested that Indonesian independence had been achieved by the grace of 
4. The 1945 constitution (Undang Undang Dasar 1945) does not adopt an official religion, but Art. 29(1) provides that “the 
State is based upon the belief in the One, Supreme God.” Meanwhile, Art. 29(2) guarantees freedom of religion [albeit only 
for the recognized religions]. Apart from tribal religions, there are also significant Muslim minorities, such as Ahmadis and 
Shias, who are not recognized. 
5. Sukarno first presented the pancasila on June 1, 1945 in his speech later designated “the birth of pancasila.” Sukarno’s 
thinking exposed distinct parallels with Islamist thought – however intentional and possibly instrumental this may have 
been. He explicitly drew parallels between the fourth principle and Islamic concepts of musyarawat (consultation) and 
mufakat (consensual unanimous decision-making arising out of such consultation). In contrast to Islamists, however, 
Sukarno believed strongly in a separation of religion and state, not only for the sake of national unity, but also notably for 
the sake of religion, remembering that state interference in religious matters under the Dutch administration had signifi-
cantly compromised religious leaders.
6. See G. Forrester, R.J. May (eds.), The Fall of Soeharto, Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst, 1998, p. 56. That Eastern 
Indonesia would break away is also what Sukarno argued in his controversial 1953 speech in Mauntai, Kalimantan. Feith 
holds that the speech had a powerful polarizing effect on the pancasila vs. Islamic state debate and that it was only after 
1952 that Muslim leaders openly spoke out against Pancasila. The term ‘nationalist’ from now on acquired a secularist 
overtone while Islamic forces such as the Islamic party Masyumi would have seen no contradiction between Islam and 
nationalism in the 1940s; see: H. Feith, The decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
(N.Y.), 1962, pp. 281-282. 
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Allah, the word ‘Allah’ was replaced by “Tuhan yang Maha Kuasa”, bahasa Indonesia for 
‘Almighty God’. 
Confronted with these consequential changes in the preamble and the constitution, 
Islamic groups temporarily withdrew their support from the national government. 
Only the appearance of the Allied powers in the fall of 1945 and the consequent attempt 
by the Netherlands to re-occupy the country swayed them to renew their loyalty to 
Jakarta. Reluctantly, regional elites who had hoped for the establishment of an Islamic 
state complied with the new constitution, fully expecting that within a year or two, a 
constituent assembly would be elected in the country’s first free and fair elections that 
would draft a new constitution and replace the Pancasila state by an Islamic state.7 
Amid Dutch attempts to reoccupy the country after WII, these elections, however, 
were not held until a full decade later. Even once the constituent assembly (“Konstitu-
ante”) was elected in 1955 and between 1956 and 1959 deliberated over a new constitu-
tion, the two-thirds majority needed for turning Indonesia into an Islamic state could 
not be reached. By 1959, president Sukarno was so frustrated with the inability of the 
Konstituante to reach a consensus that he reinstated the 1945 constitution and re-af-
firmed pancasila without the Jakarta Charter, that is, without the duty for Muslims to 
abide by Islamic law. The unitary, non-Islamic, but pan-religious formula that had been 
agreed upon in 1945 henceforth became the most characteristic feature of post-inde-
pendence Indonesia. 
The policy of Agamasasi: Turning “religion” into the building 
block of Indonesian national identity
Pancasila proved very useful in providing a pan-religious national ethos to a plural-
istic society, and could have been a window of opportunities for positive and negative 
religious freedom. However, this potential freedom was soon undermined by the Indo-
nesian state’s policy of requiring religions to be recognized as such by the state. With this 
approach, the Indonesian policy towards religion closely resembled that of Japan where 
7. Indeed, the first national elections were originally planned for January 1946. It is interesting to note that the provision of 
the 1949 Hague Agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia, which would have transformed Indonesia into a fede-
ral state, opened up the increased possibility of the revival of the Jakarta Charter, because it necessitated a new constitution 
and because it would have allowed for the implementation of Islamic law in the Muslim-majority federal units while not 
in others. The fact that this possibility was opened up by the disdained Dutch allowed the advocates of pancasila to portray 
Islamist voices as ‘anti-nationalists’ who bought into the Dutch trap that would split up Indonesia.
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Shintoism was elevated to a pan-religious ethos and where government-designed cat-
egories of religious organizations deeply shaped the content and character of religious 
life, as religious groups had to ‘qualify’ within bureaucratic categories to avoid being 
shut down.8 
Citizenship in Indonesia was henceforth tied to religion. Being an adherent of a 
state-recognized religion (agama) was required of every Indonesian to be considered 
a full citizen. According to a 1952 regulation issued by the Ministry of Religious Af-
fairs (MORA), the Indonesian government defined agama as an internationally rec-
ognized monotheistic creed with a Holy Scripture, the concept of prophethood and 
universal ethical teachings. Belief systems that did not meet these criteria were denied 
government recognition and their adherents denied the right to celebrate birth, mar-
riage, burial etc., according to their beliefs. They would also not be protected by the 
religious freedom clause enshrined in the national constitution. In the political and 
legal usage, agama as a state-recognized religion was distinguished from kepercayaan, 
non-theistic belief systems.9 Those who did not profess one of the state-recognized 
religions were referred to as “orang yang belum beragama”, people who do not yet (!) 
have a religion (e.g., Dayak, Toraja, Karo Batak etc.) “implying that they would need 
to adopt an agama if they were to become full participants” in the new state.10 Official 
identification cards listed the person’s religious affiliation and Indonesians who want-
ed to enter the military or public service needed to prove that they were a member of 
a state-recognized agama. 
Unlike the Indian regime which delegated the controversial task of delineating what 
a religion is to the judiciary, the Indonesian government instead followed the Japanese 
model and utilized the bureaucracy. During the occupation of 1942-1945, the Japa-
nese administration had founded the Office of Religious Affairs in Indonesia which 
was modeled on its own office at home, that stipulated what a true religion was.11 After 
independence, the young state of Indonesia transformed the Office of Religious Affairs 
8. See W.T. De Bary, C. Gluck, A.E. Tiedemann, W.J.J. Boot, W.M. Bodiford, Sources of Japanese tradition. Part II (1868-
2000), Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, pp. 118-121; H. Hardacre, Shinto and the State (1868-1988), Princeton 
University Press, Princeton (N.J.), 1989.
9. See I. Chalmers, Indonesia: an introduction to contemporary traditions, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne (Vic.), 
Oxford, 2006, p. 125; A. Schrauwers, Colonial “reformation” in the highlands of Central Sulawesi, Indonesia (1892-1995), 
University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2000, p. 57; L.V. Aragon, Fields of the Lord: animism, Christian minorities, and state 
development in Indonesia, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 2000, pp. 15, 33, 325.
10. I. Chalmers, Indonesia: an introduction to contemporary traditions, p. 125.
11. See M.A. Aziz, Japan’s Colonialism and Indonesia, M. Nijhoff The Hague, Leyden, 1955 (issued also as thesis), pp. 200-
208; H.J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese ccupation (1942-1945), W. van Hoeve, 
The Hague, 1958, pp. 132-149; C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam in post-colonial Indonesia, W. van Hoeve, The 
Hague, 1958, p. 116.
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into the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA). The 1952 regulation explicitly rejected 
non-theistic belief systems, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism and other 
indigenous faiths and referred to them as “dogmatic opinions that belonged to tribes 
which were still backward.”12 Thus, it was made clear by the government that if members 
of kepercayaan (currents of belief) wanted to become full members of a progressive 
nation, they had to homogenize and rationalize their belief systems along monotheistic 
lines. The adherence to faiths that not only hampered the progress of the nation but also 
openly clashed with the founding ethos of the republic (i.e. pancasila) was adverse to 
full membership in the political community.
Upon its founding, the MORA initially recognized three religions (agama): Islam, 
Protestantism and Catholicism. In 1958 Hinduism and in 1965 Buddhism were recog-
nized, after they each underwent a state-induced process of ‘reform’ along monotheistic 
lines.13 These processes of agamasasi (‘religionization’) required the revivification and 
“reinvention” of ancient traditions, rituals, narratives and texts as well as the prioritiza-
tion of certain elements over others in order to locate an omnipotent, omniscient and 
omnipresent supreme deity, a Holy Scripture and a prophet. 
The experience of Balinese Hinduism, in this respect, is particularly instructive. In 
order to meet the criteria put forth by the MORA and the principles of pancasila, Hindu 
Balinese intellectuals under the pressure from the government rebuilt the Hindu belief 
system following a monotheistic model. In order to emphasize oneness of the nation 
and God, they promoted Brahman to the “supreme god” and gave him an Indonesian 
name, Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa, while turning other gods into his “angels” and “saints.” 
The Vedas, Ramayana and Bhagavad Gita were declared the equivalent of the Qur’an 
or the Bible, and the Vedic sages (rishis) became “prophets.”14 The worship Trisandhya 
was transformed into three-times-a-day prayer, equivalent to Islamic salat. And like the 
Indian judiciary, the Balinese Hindu community also reinvented the universal teachings 
12. M. Ramstedt, “Introduction: Negotiating Identities – Indonesian ‘Hindus’ between Local, National, and Global In-
terests”, in M. Ramstedt (ed.), Hinduism in Modern Indonesia: a Minority Religion between Local, Rational, and Global 
Interests, Routledge Curzon, London-New York, 2004, p. 9.
13. See J.D. Howell, “Indonesia: Searching for Consensus”, in C. Caldarola (ed.), Religions and Societies, Asia and the Middle 
East, Mouton, Berlin-New York, 1982, pp. 511-517. The government’s policy towards Confucianism was contradictory. 
First recognized as a sixth official religion in 1965, Confucianism was removed from the list in a 1979 cabinet decision 
against in the backdrop of rising anti-Sinism during Suharto’s New Order (see Y. Heriyanto Yang, “The History and Legal 
Position of Confucianism in postindependence Indonesia”, in Marburg Journal of Religion, 10, 2005, pp. 1-8; A.J. Abalahin, 
“A Sixth Religion? Confucianism and the Negotiation of Indonesian Chinese Identity under the Pancasila State”, in A. C. 
Willford, K. M. George (eds.), Spirited Politics: Religion and PublicLife in Contemporary Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia Pro-
gram, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (N.Y.), 2005). 
14. J. Mcdaniel, “Agama Hindu Dharma Indonesia as a New Religious Movement: Hinduism Recreated in the Image of 
Islam”, in Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions, 14, 2010, pp. 96-97.
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and central tenets of their faith resembling the five pillars of Islam (e.g., dewa yadnya 
or worship to God, pitra yadnya or devotion to ancestors, manusia yadnya or devotion 
to mankind, bhuta yadnya or reverence to lower beings and resi yadnya or devotion to 
spiritual teachers).15 The process of agamasasi was essentially very similar to the judicia-
ry-sanctioned process of Semitization of religions in India.16 Taylor does at length de-
scribe the demands placed on Latin Christendom and on the Catholic Church with the 
emergence of the modern state and later notions human rights and religious tolerance, 
but nothing in his account even approaches the intrusiveness of state policies toward 
religion experienced in the Indonesian case.
The MORA’s pressure on non-theistic “currents of belief ” to universalize or 
Semitize became more pronounced after general Suharto’s ascent to power in Oc-
tober 1965. Under the “New Order”, as Suharto’s regime came to be called, anyone 
who did not profess a recognized religion risked being identified as an atheist and by 
association a communist.17 Massive anti-communist pogroms characterized the early 
years of the New Order, to which more than half a million fell victim. The pressure on 
Confucianism, yet unrecognized as agama, was therefore particular strong. Many of 
those who were originally adherents of the so-called aliran kepercayaan were forced 
by the government to either relinquish their ‘backward’ faiths or to transform and 
integrate them into an existing agama. Between 1966 and 1980 mass conversions into 
Islam and Christianity, and to a lesser extent Buddhism and Hinduism, took place es-
pecially among adherents of indigenous belief systems in Central and East Java, South 
Sulawesi, North Sumatra, and Central and North Kalimantan.18 As Schiller demon-
strates19, Indonesian bureaucrats were inclined to interpret indigenous practices as 
varieties of the recognized religions and register their adherents as members of these 
major traditions in order to attain religious, and cultural homogeneity and create 
the ideal Indonesian citizen (‘manusia pancasila’ – the Pancasila man/woman).20 
15. See M. Ramstedt, “Introduction: Negotiating Identities – Indonesian ‘Hindus’ between Local, National, and Global 
Interests”, pp. 11-12.
16. See R.W. Hefner, “Hindu Reform in an Islamizing Java: Pluralism and Peril”, in M. Ramstedt (ed.), Hinduism in modern 
Indonesia, p. 97.
17. See K. O’Shaughnessy, Gender, State and Social Power in cContemporary Indonesia: Divorce and Marriage Law, Routle-
dge, London-New York, 2009, p. 169.
18. See M. Ramstedt, “Introduction: Negotiating Identities – Indonesian ‘Hindus’ between local, national, and global inte-
rests”, p. 17; R.W. Hefner, “Hindu Reform in an Islamizing Java: Pluralism and Peril”, p. 105; J.T. Ginting, “The Position of 
Hinduism in Karo Society (North Sumatra)” in M. Ramstedt (ed.), Hinduism in modern Indonesia, p. 226.
19. See A. Schiller, “An ‘Old’ Religion in ‘New Order’ Indonesia: Notes on Ethnicity and Religious Affiliation”, in Sociology 
of Religion, 57, 1996, pp. 409-417.
20. M. Ramstedt, “Introduction: Negotiating Identities – Indonesian ‘Hindus’ between local, national, and global interests”, 
p. 17. See also K. O’Shaughnessy, Gender, state and social power in contemporary Indonesia: divorce and marriage law, p. 169.
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By doing so, authorities were not only converting people from an aliran kepercayaan 
to a recognized religion (agama), but also inducted them into Indonesian citizen-
ship.21 
Religion and religious law at Indonesian courts 
How did the politics of religion play out in the law? Like their Indian counterparts, 
Indonesian leaders were keen to put an end to the multiplicity of legal systems after 
independence and unite the nation under one law.22 Adat, or customary law, was par-
ticularly targeted by nationalist, Islamist and socialist leaders due to its “feudal, im-
perialist and anti-republican connotations.”23 As noted, customary law was gradually 
out-phased and replaced by positive state law. Islamic law, however, was more difficult 
to abolish. The state, which fought a war of independence against the Dutch from 1945-
1949, simultaneously fought secessionist movements across the islands that advocated 
the establishment of an Islamic state. Throughout these struggles, the military gained 
in political prominence and by 1966 an army general, Suharto, had taken hold of the 
government and with foreign help ousted the country’s first post-independence presi-
dent Sukarno. From 1966 until the country’s democratization in 1998, Indonesia was a 
military regime with a highly developmentalist outlook. Being marginalized since the 
failure of the Konstituante in 1959 and the establishment of Sukarno’s “Guided De-
mocracy” (a coalition of nationalists, communists and socialists), Islamic groups had 
assisted the military takeover in 1966 and participated prominently in the pogroms 
against so-called communists in 1965-66. Since the Muslim modernist party Masyumi 
had been banned by Sukarno in 1960, Islamist and Islamic leaders hoped for the revival 
of political Islam in Suharto’s “New Order” and were thus bitterly disappointed when 
Suharto upheld the ban of Masyumi, and in 1973 went so far as to “simplify the party 
system”, in whose context the only remaining Islamic political parties were forced to 
merge with others into one of two official opposition parties. 
21. See P. Freston, Evangelical and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, 2001, Cambridge, 
p. 81.
22. See A. Salim, Challenging the Secular State: the Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia, University of Hawaii Press, 
Honolulu, 2008, p. 75.
23. M. Ramstedt, “Introduction: Negotiating Identities – Indonesian ‘Hindus’ between local, national, and global interests”, p. 
8. See also R. Lukito, “Law and politics in post-independence Indonesia: a case study of religious and adat courts”, in A. Salim, 
A. Azra (eds.), Sharia and politics in modern Indonesia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003; D.S. Lev, Legal 
evolution and political authority in Indonesia: selected essays, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000, pp. 33-70.
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In compensation, Suharto gave in to two Islamist demands. He set up an Indonesian 
Ulama Council (MUI) in 1976 that gave representation to leading modernist thinkers 
and scholars and issued fatwas on urgent legal questions and dietary issues. Second-
ly, Suharto and the military watered down the draft Marriage Law that was eventually 
passed in 1974. Initially, the marriage law was envisioned to make marriage exclusively 
a civil matter by stipulating that “a marriage is valid if it is performed before an official 
marriage registrar.”24 In contrast to the dominant interpretation of Shafi‘i fiqh, the law 
would have required only the consent of the marrying parties, rather than the guardian 
of the woman, and would have set the minimum marriage age at 18 for the woman and 
21 for the man. Most importantly, by making family matters a civil law issue, the law 
would have de facto made the Islamic courts superfluous, since by default, custody and 
divorce cases would also have become civil matters. After an informal compromise was 
reached between the military and Islamic representatives, a Marriage Law was passed 
that distinguished between marriages that were ‘valid’, and marriages that were ‘legal.’ 
Marriages that fulfilled the known standards of an Islamic marriage contract (with low-
er minimum age and parents’ required consent) were ‘valid’, whereas to be ‘legal’ from 
a civil law point of view, marriages had to fulfill certain standards as specified in the 
Marriage Law. For instance, the 1974 law prohibited polygyny for civil servants. For or-
dinary citizens, polygyny was made more difficult as it required the written consent of 
the first wife accompanied with proof that she was unable to perform her duty as a wife. 
It also required proof on part of the husband that he had the material means to support 
more than one wife and their offspring. 
The continued duality of Islamic law for Muslims versus civil law for the religious 
minorities was exemplified in the fact that Muslim marriages were registered with the 
Department of Religious Affairs, while the registration of all other marriages (Buddhist, 
Hindu, Christian) was undertaken with the Ministry of the Interior. While ultimately, 
the 1974 Law slightly increased the jurisdiction of sharia courts, it demanded that the 
courts applied Shafi‘i fiqh in the framework of larger civil law regulations on marriage 
age, polygamy, alimony etc. In fact, as Federspiel holds, most state judges until 1991 
considered the sharia courts as advisory, issuing fatwas, rather than producing binding 
rulings.
Since until 1991, Islamic law was uncodified and judgments therefore unstandard-
24. M. Cammack, L.A. Young, T. Heaton, “Indonesia’s Marriage Law”, in T. Lindsey (ed.), Indonesia: Law and Society, ISEAS, 
Singapore, 2008, p. 301.
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ized, the Ministry of Religion and Supreme Court judges in 1991 issued a compilation 
of Islamic law (Kompilasi Hukum Islam – KHI) that was to give some direction as to 
the most authoritative opinions and regulations that judges in the qadi courts ought to 
invoke.25 Obviously, the compilation was not a code for qadis to follow, but it narrowed 
the range of interpretations for qadis to use, and quickly replaced citations of the Is-
lamic books previously used (the so-called ketab kuning, classical books of Shafi‘i fiqh). 
Though the New Order had still not been able to make Islamic family law entirely a state 
issue, the compilation presented an important step towards the nationalization and bu-
reaucratization of Islamic law and the unification of Muslim jurisprudence across the 
archipelago.26 Indeed, as qadi courts were now clearly recognized as courts of first in-
stance for Muslim family matters, “religious court judges began to see themselves as part 
of the wide state bureaucracy and law enforcement apparatus, rather than upholders of 
Islamic law.”27 In this regard, the compilation was in accord with the regime’s long-term 
goals of bureaucratization of religion and legal unification. 
The New Order often stressed the desirability of a single system of national law, 
that is, codified, single law derived from Indonesia’s diverse adat, religious, colo-
nial and post-independence laws that would apply to all members of the popu-
lation, regardless of ethnicity or belief, as it strongly believed in the constitutive 
power of law that would transcend local divisions, and further strengthen the 
national identity.28 
 
The family matters of the other four recognized religions continued to be dealt with 
in the civil courts. Although the law did not explicitly prohibit inter-religious marriag-
es, it is often interpreted to preclude unions between adherents of different religions, 
because marriage is defined as a contract carried out according to belief system and the 
religion of both parties.29 In 1983, Suharto solidified the government’s anti-inter-reli-
gious marriage stance with a decree that de-authorized civil registries to register mixed 
marriages where one partner was a Muslim. The 1991 Compilation of Islamic Law 
25. Since the 1991 compilation is a presidential instruction (Inpres), it enjoys a lower status than regular statutes.
26. See E. Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity: The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and Legal Practice in the Indo-
nesian Religious Courts, University of Amsterdam Press, Amsterdam, 2010; A.I. Mawardi, Socio-Political Background of the 
Enactment of Kompilasi Hukum Islam Di Indonesia, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1998.
27. S. Butt, “Polygamy and Mixed Marriage in Indonesia: Islam and Marriage Law in the Courts”, in T. Lindsey (ed.), Indo-
nesia: Law and Society, ISEAS, Singapore, 2008, p. 274.
28. Ibid., p. 269.
29. See K. O’Shaughnessy, Gender, State and Social Power in Contemporary Indonesia: Divorce and Marriage Law, p. 170. 
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(KHI) went one step further and in Article 40-c explicitly prohibited Muslim men from 
marrying non-Muslim women – in contradiction to Syafi‘i fiqh.30 The reason was of 
pragmatic nature: the offspring of couples with a non-Muslim mother tended to adopt 
the mother’s rather than the father’s religion, and thereby contributed to the growth of 
non-Muslim religions in Indonesia. 
Since there is no limit or penalty on individual religious conversion in Indonesia, 
hindrances against inter-religious marriage are usually overcome by one partner con-
verting, at least for the letter of the law, to the partner’s religion. Once partners have 
declared their shared religion, it is a relatively simple matter to determine whether the 
marriage will be certified in an Islamic or a civil court. In contrast to India, courts are 
little concerned with establishing proof of the litigant’s religious identity. In fact, as 
O’Shaughnessy demonstrates through her analysis of six inter-religious marriage and 
divorce cases from 1987 to 2003, courts have almost completely refrained from dealing 
with questions of religious identity.31 Instead, the courts took litigants’ declared identity 
at face value and did not seek to determine the authenticity of the declared religious 
identity. Indonesian justices were in fact quite careful not to transgress the MORA’s 
jurisdiction by openly discussing questions of ethnic, religious identity or inter-group 
relations which were strictly prohibited under the New Order.32 In contrast to India, the 
national culture that the post-independent governments in Indonesia promoted were 
not unmistakably identified with one particular religion or ethnicity. While minorities 
in India increasingly interpreted the state’s promotion of “Indianness” as a euphemism 
for promoting Hindu as a dominant culture, the national ethos of pancasila is not un-
derstood as a covert way for promoting Muslim-majority culture. If anything, Islamic 
intellectuals in the history of post-independence Indonesia saw tensions between ‘Is-
lamic ways of life’ and pancasila. The fact that pancasila cannot be closely identified 
with any of the major religions of Indonesia is, for the purposes of nation-building, a 
covert blessing as it precluded the association of Indonesianness with one particular 
culture or religion. 
30. See A.I. Mawardi, Socio-Political Background of the Enactment of Kompilasi Hukum Islam Di Indonesia, p. 61. In all Sunni 
schools of law, it is permitted for a Muslim man to marry a non-Muslim wife, but not the other way around. The classical 
sources legitimated this view with reference to women’s rights. Outside Islam, a woman would likely be treated worse. 
Noting that children tend to follow the religious practices of their mother, with the KHI the 20th century Indonesian state 
has turned Sunni fiqh around, as it tended to result in increased conversion away from Islam.
31. See K. O’Shaughnessy, Gender, State andSsocial Power in Ccontemporary Indonesia: Divorce and Marriage Law, pp. 
170-177.
32. See R.S. Kipp, Dissociated Identities: Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in an Indonesian Society, University of Michigan Press, 
Ann Arbor, 1993, p. 110.
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The unsecular politics of democracy 
The post-1998 period has seen an important development in the realm of religion 
and law. As part of the democratization process, the country started in 2001 to signifi-
cantly decentralize governmental functions down to the units of the districts, called ‘re-
gencies’ (of which today more than 500 exist, in 33 provinces). Development and public 
expenditure came under purview of the sub-provincial regions of Indonesia rather than 
the center or the provinces. Until 2009, in more than 10% of the country’s districts, reg-
ulations were passed that signaled an Islamizing agenda (Parsons and Mietzner 2009).33 
Such regulations cluster around South Sulawesi, West Java and West Sumatra and range 
from banning alcohol, to enforcing dress codes and curfew laws (for women who shall 
not walk outside without a male guardian after sundown), to compelling couples to re-
cite the Qur’an at their wedding.34 For instance, a 2009 regulation in Tasikmalaya (West 
Java) specified that all Muslims must fight against corruption, fornication, prostitution, 
gambling, and consuming alcohol. It also pronounced as illegal: abortion, using por-
nography, charging interest, “practicing traditional healing if it leads people towards 
polytheism (syirik)”, or spreading heterodox sects.35 Officials (men and women) were 
ordered to wear Islamic dress on Fridays, and schools were told to ensure that all pupils 
could recite the Qur’an. In yet other regions, the so-called sharia-based laws have had a 
decisively local flavor. In Bulukumba in South Sulawasi, public signs are now issued in 
Arabic script, arguably to play up regional specificity as an act of defiance against the 
culturally homogenizing policies of Jakarta. Some of these bylaws clearly violate the 
rights granted in the constitution, such as religious freedom (Art. 29), the equality of all 
recognized religions, and the equality of men and women. Despite the fact that many 
such regulations appear incongruent with the constitution, they are still on the books, 
as review mechanisms are not yet properly institutionalized or overburdened, and the 
Supreme Court, the final court of appeal in these matters, not sufficiently committed to 
deal with such regulations. 
33. See N. Parsons – M. Mietzner, “Sharia By Laws in Indonesia: A Legal and Political Analysis”, in The Australian Journal 
of Asian Law, 11, 2009, pp. 190-217.
34. On bylaws that target women, see for instance, the Rule No. 14 of 2002 issued by the Province Aceh on the Banning of 
Khalwat (Dating); Regional Regulation No. 15 on The Banning of Prostitution and Socially Undesirable Deeds issued by 
the District of Bandar Lampung; Regulation No. 3 of 2002 on Prohibition of Prostitution and Amoral Deeds enacted by the 
District of Lahat; Regulation No. 12 of 2003 on the Prevention of Immoral Act, put into effect by the District of Mataram; 
and Regulation No. 39 of 1999 on the Banning of Places Offering Commercial Sex, promulgated by the District of Kupang. 
Siti Musdah Mulia, Islam dan Inspirasi Kesetaran Gender, pp. 243-246. 
35. Surat Ederan Bupati Cianjur No 451/2717/ASSDA.1.
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One may, as John Bowen does,36 see the sharica-based laws as new signs of provin-
cial or regional distinctiveness and authenticity. In his account, demands for sharica are 
deeply situated in the history of the fight for independence against the Dutch, ensuing 
struggles for autonomy against Jakarta, and debates about the relative role of religion in 
the country’s law and politics. In the post-1998 era of reform and decentralization, shar-
ica signifies the resurgence of local capacities to define and exploit ideas of authenticity, 
autonomy and morality, ideas which have strong political, cultural, and often religious 
dimensions. Whether Bowen is right in seeing the bylaws as part of a larger process 
of redefining and re-legitimizing the country’s institutions, or whether one should, as 
many observers do, consider the religious bylaws as a sign of Indonesia captured by a 
nation-wide religious frenzy in the aftermath of democratization and the deregulation 
of religion, surely democratization has changed conditions of belief. There is yet no 
debate, and indeed very little awareness of, the violence done unto all religions, Islam 
included, in the 1950-1970s due to the provisions of the MORA. There is also still very 
little questioning whether tying citizenship to religion is compatible with democracy 
and in particular with the freedom of religion guaranteed in the constitution.
conclusions
Through bureaucratization, religion in post-independence Indonesia was not only 
made “manageable” but also put into the service of government policy. Alternative 
sources of meaning and beliefs were subjugated; those belief systems not recognized 
were effectively suppressed (e.g. Kejawen, Judaism, Shiism) and alternative sources of 
meaning within recognized religions undermined and marginalized. The type of func-
tional conflicts regarding the relation of religious truth to other sources of truth that 
Gorski charts following Luhmann were made impossible through state policy that with-
drew the availability of a non-religious identity. The state bureaucracy was also involved 
in ascertaining and defining religion, notably in requiring of Hinduism and Buddhism 
to fulfill certain criteria of monotheism. The state thereby became a party in the con-
flicts within religious communities that Gorski outlines. It did so in all four dimensions 
(segmentary, center/periphery, stratificatory, functional conflicts). Religious practices 
were redefined and “purified”, creeds “rationalized” and standardized by the state, of-
36. See J. Bowen, Can Islam Be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State.  Princeton University Press., Prin-
ceton (N.J.), 2010.
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ten to make them “modernist”, “rationalist”, “humanist” and “tolerant.” Agamasasi was 
particularly aimed to fight against communism, “to extirpate indigenous religions that 
do not easily support development, to meld and smooth over differences among Indo-
nesian religions, to neutralize any influence that religious sects have to take issue with 
national platforms [and] to support the dissociation of religious and ethnic identities.”37 
It was instrumental to reduce ethno-religious heterogeneity and promote a singular 
monotheistic image of religion. 
Secularity III (exclusive humanism, the possibility of non-religion) in post-indepen-
dence Indonesia has been subordinated to national culture, a national ethos that cele-
brates managed diversity. Indeed, the strong urge to nationalize is prevalent beyond the 
politics of managing diversity – one may also look at the attempts of the KHI to national-
ize Islamic law, to mold it into an Indonesian brand sensitive of local cultural sentiments, 
something specifically Indonesian and thus separate from Arab or South Asian Islamic 
legal traditions. God is not one choice among several, Indonesian citizens only have the 
choice between different paths towards God. Secularity II in the sense of a diminution 
of religious beliefs and practices is discouraged by the state, and state policies since 1945 
have actively promoted religion and religiosity, within state-sanctioned perimeters. Yet, 
secularity I has been a building block of the Indonesian state since 1945 and represents 
an overall societal consensus. The Indonesian state, both under authoritarian and demo-
cratic governments, has actively cultivated a social imaginary where one does not live in 
an “immanent frame”, in “cosmic, social and moral orders which can be fully explained 
on their own terms”, but instead a national frame that is expression of and works towards 
(1) the belief in God, (2) a just and civilized humanity, (3) national unity, (4) democracy 
guided by the inner wisdom of unanimity arising out of deliberations among representa-
tives, and (5) social justice (the five pancasila principles).
Throughout the downfall of the New Order regime and transition to democracy, 
the pancasila- and agamasasi-based nation-building project has been, to a great extent, 
successful at projecting a unified national identity and creating and preserving relatively 
peaceful interfaith relations. Even the spirals of anti-Chinese and later Christian-Mus-
lim violence that flared up during the Indonesian transition to democracy in 1998 – but 
died down again since 2002 – have not been able to undermine the overall belief that 
Indonesia is a multi-religious and multi-cultural society that lives of its diversity. In the 
post-1998 rounds of constitutional reform, those voices advocating a re-communal-
37. L.V. Aragon, Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities, and State Development in Indonesia, p. 312. See also A. 
Schrauwers, Colonial “Reformation” in the Highlands of Central Sulawesi, Indonesia (1892-1995), p. 92.
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ization of the legal system remained in the minority and the pancasila character of the 
national constitution was eventually retained and affirmed. As Azra (2008) notes “by 
and large, religious diversity and peaceful coexistence among the followers of different 
religions in Indonesia remain intact and prospects for religious pluralism… are quite 
bright.”38 
Taylor suggests that rather than applying a strict separationist definition of secular-
ism, contemporary secular regimes should be thought of as such if they attempt to max-
imize three goods: equality (between religions, as well as between religion and non-re-
ligion), liberty (of religious belief and practice, as well as of the choice not to believe), 
and fraternity (inclusion of all voices in “the ongoing process of determining what the 
society is about (its political identity)”.39 Taylor’s approach aims to refute that secularism 
can be thought of in terms of timeless principles à la Rawls; instead, he suggests secu-
larism must be recognized as requiring ongoing renegotiation in society. His notion of 
secularism is therefore not one of strict separation of religion and state, but one that 
balances between the three goals and in that remains responsive to changing needs of 
society. Indonesia’s post-independence religion-state relations can be viewed in light of 
Taylor’s three goals. Until the country’s democratization in 1998, the goals of hearing 
all voices (fraternity) and ensuring free choice (liberty) were largely made subservi-
ent to the goal of equality (treating all recognized religions as largely equal). Fraternity 
was violated when the MORA imposed a monotheistic notion of religion on poly- and 
non-theistic faiths, and thereby promoted internal elite-driven reforms of Hinduism 
and Buddhism that fulfilled bureaucratic requirements. The principle of liberty was 
violated when MORA made state recognition of religion (agama) a requirement for 
citizenship, thereby de facto banning the profession of alternative faiths, including Ju-
daism, Shi‘i Islam, heterodox Sunni variants of Islam, and other local faith systems. The 
lacking freedom not to profess a religion (negative freedom of religion), as well as the 
continuing requirement for recognized religions to abide by state-sanctioned defini-
tions are hard, if not impossible, to reconcile with the post-1998 promises of democracy. 
In the medium-term, constitutional jurisprudence will need to address these deficits.
Yet for Taylor, fraternity also implies maintaining “relations of harmony and comity 
between the supporters of different religions and Weltanschauungen.”40 The policy of re-
38. A. Azra, “Religious Pluralism in Indonesia”, in A. Azra, W. Hudson (eds.), Islam Beyond Conflict: Indonesian Islam and 
Western Political Theory, Ashgate, Aldershot-Burlington (VT), 2008, p. 119.
39. C. Taylor, Why We need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism, in E. Mendieta, J. Vanantwerpen (eds.), The Power of Reli-
gion in the Public Sphere, Columbia University Press, New York Chichester, 2011, p. 35. 
40. Ibid.
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quiring religious identification for citizenship in Indonesia, as well as the pancasila ide-
ology that seeks to accommodate all religions equally can be viewed as being aimed at 
precisely this end: maintaining relations of harmony and comity between the supporters 
of different religions. These relations in turn are deemed essential for inter-faith peace 
and appreciation for the difference of the other (“unity in diversity”). Even though the 
violations emerging from this policy are unambiguously evident, the Indonesian case 
points to the age-old trade-off between liberty and fraternity. The German constitution-
al theorist Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde formulated a version of this trade-off when he 
wrote in the late 1960s, 
the liberal, secularized state is nourished by presuppositions that it cannot itself 
sustain. On the one hand, it can only survive as a liberal state if the liberty it allows 
its citizens regulates itself from within on the basis of the moral substance of the 
individual and the homogeneity of society. On the other hand, it cannot attempt 
to guarantee those inner regulatory forces by its own efforts – that is to say, with 
the instruments of legal coercion and authoritative command – without abandon-
ing the very liberalness on which it is founded.41 
The “Böckenförde dilemma”, as it has become known since, points to the pre-polit-
ical bases of the state. Democracies require certain degrees of cohesion and solidarity 
within society without which the democratic process will soon be undermined. Yet, 
because of their liberal commitments, democracies cannot, unlike authoritarian states, 
impose homogeneity and cohesion from above. Indonesia’s democratization process, 
begun in 1998, has so far survived because these pre-political bases (a shared identi-
ty among Indonesians, a moral substance of Indonesianness) had been created in the 
course of the independence struggle and the subsequent regimes under Sukarno and 
Suharto. As much as they violated the rights of individuals and communities, pancasila 
and the policies of MORA undoubtedly contributed to the peaceful coexistence among 
followers of different religions that made the democratization process possible. 
Yet, with the rounds of constitutional revisions (1999-2002) which transformed the 
Indonesian constitution into a liberal document able to provide the basis for a ful-
ly functioning democracy, the Indonesian state has committed itself to parting with 
its historical policy of creating that “moral substance” and “homogeneity” from above. 
41. E.W. Böckenförde, “The Rise of the State as a Process of Secularisation”, in E.W. Böckenförde, State, Society and Liberty. 
Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law, Berg, New York-Oxford, 1991, p. 45.
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Democratization, has, as it were, turned the tables. It is now for civil society to fulfill 
that function and work towards nourishing the pre-political bases of the state that bind 
communities together. Given the historical record, religion will be a poor resource in 
this endeavor. 
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